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 This paper provides an update of the trend towards greater private provision of policing and 
security services in the European Union (EU). Although data must be treated with caution, recent 
ﬁ gures indicate growth from around 600,000 security employees in 1999 to well over a million 
today. To predict future trends, researchers must undertake international comparisons of the reach 
of private security and make a start towards drawing a comprehensive picture of the means by 
which security industries are best monitored and regulated in national jurisdictions. The authors 
argue that, in addition, issues of equality, professionalism and accountability surrounding priva-
tized policing must become a focus of research attention by practitioners and theorists alike. 
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 Introduction 
 The commercial demand for private contract security speciﬁ cally, and private policing more 
generally, grows steadily upwards. Those who have invested in security industries have wit-
nessed steady growth in their earnings over the past quarter century. Paid security providers, 
in terms of numbers of personnel and annual expenditures at the very least, now dominate 
the order maintenance landscape in many nations ( Bayley and Shearing, 2001 ). The fact that 
trends in private security continue so strongly today is not particularly surprising, given that 
the publicly funded agencies of order maintenance that evolved and grew during the 19th 
century development of modern policing never really eradicated the private forms of polic-
ing that had preceded them ( Johnston, 1992 ). The upshot of this resurgence is a modern mix 
of public and private options and roles. There is now greater reliance on private security 
industries as part of overall policing strategies, or, as some would prefer to say,  “ governance 
of security ” ( Johnston and Shearing, 2003, p. 9 ). Today, private sector employees are globally 
recognized as vital partners in preventing and detecting crime ( Stenning, 2000 ). 
 Over the last two decades, the globally observed restructuring of policing has also 
become more visible across the European Union (EU). Large numbers of organizations now 
offer a kaleidoscope of services and products including manned guarding (both  “ in-house ” 
and  “ contract ” ), alarm monitoring, security equipment production, transport of cash, 
investigation of white-collar crime and provision of advice on risk management ( George 
and Button, 2000 ;  Button, 2002 ;  Van Steden, 2004 ). Uniformed security guards are, by far, 
Ronald van Steden and Rick Sarre
 Growth of Private Security 
223
the most observable exponents of private security occupations. Their presence is consider-
ably intensiﬁ ed alongside the police and police-like bodies (e.g. city wardens) that are 
visibly deployed for safeguarding urban areas ( Sarre, 2005 ). The  “ quiet revolution ” in polic-
ing observed so long ago ( Shearing  et al ., 1980, p. 1 ) has become a noisy 21st century 
juggernaut. 
 It is remarkable, then, that the body of knowledge on the extent, powers, regulation and 
social impact of private security, although steadily evolving, remains relatively small. While 
a growing number of researchers display interest in security industry trends, the 
 “ mainstream ” criminological analysis of policing is still very much limited to  “ traditional ” 
criminal justice representations of  “ blue colored ” police forces ( Manning, 2005 ). Not to 
expand this body of knowledge to include private trends would be a mistake. If not handled 
appropriately, the phenomenon of privatization may have serious social consequences, such 
as segregation of communities, polarization of security availability, and social exclusion of 
marginalized groups. To be able to keep abreast of developments and trends, it is important, ﬁ rst 
and foremost, to sketch the growth and reach of private security in the contemporary world. 
 Measuring the private security industry 
 The private security  “ industry ” is not some clearly deﬁ ned homogenous group, but rather a 
multitude of industries, large and small, all related to the provision of security services, 
investigation, crime prevention, order maintenance, systems planning, technical consulting 
and security design. Often these industries are quite different from each other in structure, 
authority, purpose and method ( Prenzler, 2005 ). Indeed, the sheer variety of private security 
occupations makes it problematic to measure  “ how big ” the industry is ( Jones and Newburn, 
1995 ). Different experts use different deﬁ nitions, which results in a rather capricious inclu-
sion and exclusion of different security segments. In other words, it is not entirely clear what 
ﬁ rms and services one should label  “ private security ” . In the Netherlands, for example, 
some accountancy ﬁ rms have set up forensic services for clients, and offer private detective 
work, while other security companies undertake activities such as limousine hiring or facil-
ity management alongside their security activities. The private security industry thus ﬂ ows 
into a large variety of markets, making accurate classiﬁ cation and counting very difﬁ cult. 
 Additionally, the quality of available ofﬁ cial statistical sources varies considerably from 
country to country. Sound information is difﬁ cult to obtain in some jurisdictions due to gaps 
in ofﬁ cial employment registrations that do not differentiate between full-time and part-time 
personnel. This lack of clarity leads to some estimates clearly  over -stating  “ private ” work-
force numbers. On the other hand, however, many  “ in-house ” security staff (especially those 
who are performing more than one role) may not be counted in ofﬁ cial estimates, so it can 
also be argued that the manpower of private security is actually  under estimated. Moreover, 
most private ﬁ rms do not like to advertise their market share, revenues or personnel numbers 
and are therefore unlikely to divulge information to researchers. Nonetheless, there is 
consensus among observers about the mounting pervasiveness of private security in many 
countries. Previous comparative research clearly indicates the substantial contribution of 
security companies to internal security within the EU ( Ottens  et al ., 1999 ;  Van Outrive, 
1999 ;  Van Steden and Huberts, 2005 ;  Jones and Newburn, 2006 ). That trend appears set to 
continue. 
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 The EU today 
 In the 1999 volume of the  European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research , Jaap de 
Waard, a Dutch civil servant, published the ﬁ rst major English language international study 
of private security services (PSSs) covering 27 countries (i.e., all 15 EU members at the time 
plus 12 others) ( De Waard, 1999 ). It was based upon reports from the European Commis-
sion Directorate-General for Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs in 1996. 
De Waard estimated that there were 592,050 security personnel in Europe in a population of 
369 million. That meant that there were 160 security personnel per 100,000 population, 
compared to 375 public police per 100,000. He further estimated that 75 per cent of secu-
rity personnel worked for contract ﬁ rms, with the remainder  “ in-house ” . De Waard found 
very large variations in personnel numbers between countries. Great Britain and Germany 
had the most security personnel, with 275 per 100,000 and 217 per 100,000, respectively. 
Finland and Greece had the lowest proportions with 69 and 19, respectively. Overall, his 
article indicated that, in indicative terms only, police still outnumbered security personnel in 
the EU by a rough estimate of 2:1. 
 On 1 May 2004, the EU-Member states grew from 15 to 25 as Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia entered the 
Union. This radically altered the private security landscape. The international picture paint-
ed by De Waard requires revision. Even taking into account the problems of measuring ac-
curately personnel numbers, based on our estimates below, we conclude that there are well 
over one million people employed in private security industries in the EU today. Drawing on 
De Waard ’ s ﬁ gure of almost 600,000 employees in 1999, this amounts to an increase of 
some 500,000 employees across EU-Member states in less than a decade. The police / private 
security ratio, too, has moved up to 1 to 0.71 overall in 2004, compared to the EU average 
of 1 to 0.43 in 1999 ( De Waard, 1999, p. 156 ). 
 The information presented in  Table 1 provides a statistical snapshot of the EU today. It is 
based upon a report published by the Confederation of European Security Services (CoESS) 1 
and Uni-Europa 2 ( Morr é , 2004 ). The ﬁ gures are drawn from employment data in the public 
and private policing sector. In the pages that follow, we consider these ﬁ gures in the light of 
information from a variety of sources. 
 Scandinavia 
 We begin with a discussion of Denmark, Finland and Sweden. These countries have, in 
absolute and relative terms, small private security industries. A plausible explanation for this 
might be the traditionally low crime rates ofﬁ cially reported in Scandinavian countries. 
Furthermore, as  De Waard (1999, p. 167) notes, the Danish police, historically, do not enter 
into so-called commercial public – private partnerships. The Danish government is 
reluctant to cooperate with security services, although, remarkably, two of the largest multi-
national security ﬁ rms in Europe (Falck and Securitas) were founded in Denmark and 
 
1
  CoESS was founded in 1989 as an umbrella organization for national associations of private security industries 
 www.coess.org . 
 
2
  Uni-Europa is part of an international Union network,  www.uni-europa.org . 
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Sweden, respectively. The latest ﬁ gures indicate that there may be over 5,000 private secu-
rity personnel in Denmark (for a ratio of 1 to 0.38, police to private security) and double that 
number in Sweden, for a not dissimilar ratio of 1 to 0.56. 
 Finland has a higher level of private security in comparison with its police force while, 
per head of population, it has fewer security personnel (1 per 867) than Sweden (with 1 per 
530). Finland ’ s  Act on Private Security Services (along with supplementary decrees) gov-
erns several  “ guarding ” and  “ protection ” sectors. We ﬁ nd the same kind of regulatory sys-
tems in Denmark. Sweden ’ s regulatory regime covers most private security areas except 
alarm stations, in-house security and cash-in-transit (CIT) and has been applauded as a 
regime that is worthy of replication ( Meacher, 2002 ). In Sweden and Finland, but not in 
Denmark, ﬁ rearms carriage is permitted with special authorization. 
 Because Norway and Iceland are outside the EU, they are not discussed in the latest 
CoESS statistics. This makes it hard to provide sound information.  De Waard (1999, 
pp. 155, 157) found 4,000 to 5,000 Norwegian security employees, but there are no current 
 Table 1  Police forces and private security services in 25 EU-Member States 
 Country   Total police  Total private 
security 
 Private security/
population ratio 
 Private security/
police ratio 
 Austria  30,000  6,790  1 /1,208  0.23 
 Belgium  39,000  18,320  1 /562  0.47 
 Cyprus  3,000  1,500  1 /517  0.50 
 Czech Republic  47,400  28,100  1 /363  0.59 
 Denmark  14,000  5,250  1 /1,010  0.38 
 Estonia  3,600  4,900  1 /286  1.36 
 Finland  7,500  6,000  1 /867  0.80 
 France  145,000  117,000  1 /516  0.81 
 Germany  250,000  170,000  1 /485  0.68 
 Greece  49,900  25,000  1 /428  0.50 
 Hungary  40,000  80,000  1 /125  2.00 
 Ireland  12,000  20,000  1 /195  1.67 
 Italy  280,000 a  55,000  1 /1,056  0.20 
 Latvia  10,600  5,000  1 /460  0.47 
 Lithuania  20,000  10,000  1 /360  0.50 
 Luxembourg  1,573  2,200  1 /210  1.40 
 Malta  1,800  700  1 /572  0.39 
 The Netherlands  49,000  30,000  1 /543  0.61 
 Poland  103,309  200,000  1 /193  1.94 
 Portugal  46,000  28,000  1 /375  0.61 
 Slovakia  21,500  20,840  1 /259  0.97 
 Slovenia  7,500  4,500  1 /444  0.60 
 Spain  193,450  89,450  1 /450  0.46 
 Sweden  18,000  10,000  1 /530  0.56 
 United Kingdom  141,398  150,000  1 /401  1.06 
     
 Total  1,535,530  1,088,550  1 /410  0.71 
 Source :  Morr é (2004 ). 
 
a
 This number is based on  De Waard’s (1999) estimate of the Italian police force numbers, because of missing data 
in the CoESS report. 
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and reliable ﬁ gures available on the private security industry in either of these two nations. 
For the record, according to publicly accessible data sources, Norway and Iceland 
employ 11,000 3 and 700 4 police ofﬁ cers, respectively. 
 Western Europe 
 Germany, the United Kingdom and France are indisputably the leaders in Western Europe 
in providing PSSs. As seen in  Table 1 , in sheer numbers, Germany takes the ﬁ rst position 
with approximately 170,000 personnel. Informed estimates place the number of employees 
in the U.K. (including Northern Ireland) much higher than the 150,000 reported by the 
sources available to Morr é . For example,  Button (2002, p. 99) arrives at a ﬁ gure of 217,000 
private security staff. Jones and Newburn in 1995 counted over 300,000 people engaged in 
private policing occupations (1995, p. 229). Even on the lower number, police ofﬁ cers are 
outnumbered by private security in the U.K. by a ratio of 1 to 1.06. In France, the ratio is 
1 to 0.81 and in Germany slightly lower at 1 to 0.68. 
 Germany has implemented trade regulation laws that apply to security enterprises, but 
legal standards are also embedded in other legislation. Training and education are provided 
by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry and by professional organizations. Specialized 
private security personnel (e.g. guards at military installations) are allowed to carry guns. 
 In France, privatized policing strategies have gained ﬁ rm ground, but comparisons with 
public police are difﬁ cult. CoESS probably underestimates the French public policing 
system (145,000), for previous studies show a police strength of at least 220,000 ofﬁ cers 
( De Waard, 1999, p. 155 ;  Ottens  et al ., 1999, p. 81 ;  Ocqueteau, 2006, p. 66 ).  Ocqueteau 
(2006, p. 74) maintains that private security does not challenge the sovereign role of police 
and the gendarmerie. Rather, commercial security supplements the state ’ s security resources 
and is rarely perceived to be equal to its traditional public forces. In 1983 and 1984, statu-
tory regulations were issued in France to guarantee better supervision over the security in-
dustry and to improve the quality of private guarding, surveillance and protection. Recent 
ﬁ gures indicate that the average age of (predominantly) male security employees is 
trending downwards, which might signal a slow but sure professionalization of the sector 
( Ocqueteau, 2006, pp. 68 – 69 ). 
 Legislation for the private security sector in the United Kingdom did not exist until 
relatively recently. Private guards, investigators and door supervisors relied upon voluntary 
self-regulation ( Button, 2002 ). In 2001, however, the English parliament passed the  Private 
Security Industry Act . It was a ﬁ rst attempt to regulate contract and in-house security guards, 
the CIT sector, private investigators, wheel clampers, security consultants and bodyguards. 
Its main contributions were the introduction of a licensing system and the creation of a 
Security Industry Authority (SIA) to monitor the quality and legitimacy of security industry 
services. 
 The Republic of Ireland has a large private security presence (approximately 20,000 
strong) and its ratio of police to private security indicates that the former are well outnum-
bered by the latter (1 to 1.67). The number of private personnel per head of population 
 
3
  See  www.politi.no. 
 
4
  See  http://logreglan.is. 
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(1 per 195) is one of the highest in Europe. Yet Ireland was one of the few countries in which 
detailed legal standards for the industry did not exist until 2004 with the passage of the  PSSs 
Act . 
 In the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, there are more private security personnel than 
police ofﬁ cers (a ratio of 1 police ofﬁ cer to 1.4 security ofﬁ cers) and the overwhelming 
majority of these are in full-time roles. Possible explanations for this are the fairly large 
banking sector and the importance of EU institutions (e.g. the Court of Justice) based in 
Luxembourg. With regard to the private security / population ratio, the Austrian rate is the 
lowest in Europe at one private ofﬁ cer per 1,208 population. Nevertheless, there are 200 
companies (on 2003 ﬁ gures) active in Austria, employing 6,790 people. The annual turnover 
of  S 200 million (2001) is steadily increasing by 2 – 3 per cent per year. While there are no 
speciﬁ c laws for the Austrian security market, there are general commercial laws with rele-
vance to specialized (guarding) companies. Like Norway and Iceland, Switzerland lies out-
side the EU. It employed roughly 7,000 private security workers in 1999 ( De Waard, 1999, 
p. 155 ) but there are no recent ﬁ gures available. 
 Belgium and the Netherlands have moderately sized private security industries. The ratio 
of police to private security personnel (1 to 0.47 and 1 to 0.61, respectively) is quite similar. 
Morr é ’ s estimates of the Dutch police strength appear somewhat low as she fails to count 
some ofﬁ cers working for special police forces such as the National Police Agency and the 
Military Police ( Van Steden and Huberts, 2006, pp. 24 – 25 ). Estimates on the Dutch security 
industry vary between 27,000 to over 30,000 people, depending on what one considers  “ pri-
vate security ” . Technical equipment services are, for example, often omitted from ofﬁ cial 
ﬁ gures. Drawing on information from UNETO-VNI, a professional trade association, this 
sector consists of at least 335 companies, comprising 6,500 people and generating  S 810 
million per year. A noticeable trend is that technical equipment services are increasingly 
offered in conjunction with manned guarding services. Representatives of both sectors have 
lately taken part in the activities of the Union of Private Security Organizations ( Van Steden 
and Huberts, 2006, p. 21 ). Both Belgium and the Netherlands have laws that regulate the 
industry beyond manned guarding, and include private detectives, alarm monitoring sys-
tems, the CIT sector and  “ in-house ” security workers in their purview. Dutch and Belgian 
laws also include strict regulation of uniforms, training and criminal background checks. 
Contrary to the situation in the Netherlands, however, some Belgian guards are permitted to 
carry ﬁ rearms. The Dutch division of Group 4 Securicor has been granted permission to 
provide custodial services to detention centers, which puts the company in a unique business 
position. 
 Central and Eastern Europe 
 The collapse of socialist bureaucracies and the consequent sale of state assets since the fall 
of the Berlin Wall in 1989 have presumably contributed to the spectacular growth of private 
security in former Soviet bloc or Warsaw Pact countries ( Brodeur  et al ., 2003, p. 6 ). Central 
and Eastern EU-Member states have also reportedly suffered from waves of criminal 
activity within their borders, providing another incentive for those who can afford to seek 
supplementary policing ( Caparini and Marenin, 2005 ). Countries like the Czech Republic, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia are now witnessing strong growth in private security 
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markets. Other Central and Eastern European EU-Member states have also seen a consider-
able rise in the number of new private security and protection agencies. In Slovakia, Estonia, 
Hungary and Poland, private security personnel now match or exceed their police numbers. 
In the case of Poland and Hungary, the number is double the police number. According to 
CoESS, the yearly ﬁ nancial turnover is massive, for example,  S 40 million in Estonia (2001 
ﬁ gures) and  S 933 million in Poland. 
 The monitoring of private security in these regions is best described as a  “ work in 
progress ” . Two of the Baltic states, Estonia and Latvia, regulate manned guarding services 
and related areas by their respective Security Acts. Lithuania has implemented a law on in-
dividuals and property safety. The same trends are observed in most of the newly admitted 
EU-Member States. Except for the Czech Republic, all governments have instigated spe-
ciﬁ c legal guidelines addressing private security. Requirements such as criminal background 
checks, identiﬁ cation cards and special permission to carry handguns are standard and, in 
some cases, mandatory (e.g., Czech guards). The Czech Republic and Slovenia offer univer-
sity training for both public policing and private policing. Police practitioners and students 
seeking a career in various (governmental) security agencies are taught at the Police Acad-
emy in Prague and the College of Police and Security Studies in Ljubljana. 
 Southern Europe 
 There is a relatively low private security / police ratio in Southern European countries. In 
Greece, for example, a security market barely existed until 1997 ( Rigakos and Papanicolaou, 
2003, p. 298 ). At present, however, there may be as many as 25,000 to 30,000 private secu-
rity personnel, which represents about half the number of police ofﬁ cers. Legislation was 
introduced in 1997 to mandate a number of requirements covering security licensing, uni-
forms, training and dogs. The license holder ’ s criminal record must be checked and he / she 
is obliged to have joined the national army. Elsewhere  Papanicolaou (2006, pp. 87 – 89) 
delves into the Greek private detective market. This security niche consists of about 120, 
often small, agencies, and has a history that is over 50 years. Detective work involves com-
mercial fraud investigations and inquiries into family matters, but various investigation ﬁ rms 
also sell and install technical security devices. In 2003, private detective agencies were 
brought under existing regulatory legislation. Police in Italy employ 280,000 public police 
ofﬁ cers, which is ﬁ ve times the number of estimated private security agencies ’ numbers. 
Likewise, Cyprus, Malta, Portugal and Spain make more use of police ofﬁ cers than security 
guards. Nevertheless, with the exception of Cyprus (which has a draft law currently before 
the Parliament), these governments have provided comprehensive governing frameworks to 
achieve some form of regulation of private policing options. 
 Elsewhere in the region 
 Seen from an international perspective, the renaissance of private security in the EU is not 
exceptional. The resurgence of private forms of security is a worldwide phenomenon ( Wood 
and Kempa, 2005 ). The following information, as represented in  Table 2 , offers a useful 
insight into private security in nations proximate to, but outside, the EU, and allows some 
preliminary comparisons to be drawn. 
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 South Eastern Europe 
 The growth of private security companies in South Eastern Europe is probably a direct result 
of perceptions of a growing  “ market of violence ” in the region ( Eppler, 2002 ). But there 
are some misgivings over the response. In Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Macedonia and Albania, concerns have been raised relating to the (mis)use of 
weapons, including automatic weapons, by private security. Croatia is more stable, but in this 
country there have been allegations that private security companies ﬁ nancially support politi-
cal parties in the hope of receiving special favors. The Moldovan security industry is relatively 
small. Most strikingly, in the province of Transdniestria, a tiny corner near the Ukraine border, 
one security company dominates the market. In Romania, along with Bulgaria, the situation 
has improved drastically over the last decade. These countries host the most developed and 
professional security industries in the region. However, issues such as the absence of demo-
cratic oversight, ineffective implementation of legislation and rivalry between police forces 
and security companies are of major concern to observers ( SEESAC, 2005 ). 
 Russia 
 The collapse of the Soviet Union and a  “ hidden ” private security legacy prior to the break-
up have both contributed to the dramatic expansion of the private security market in Russia 
( Favarel-Garrigues and Le Hu é rou, 2004 ). This market is generally divided between detec-
tive agencies, PSSs and private protection companies (PPCs). In 1999, statistics indicated 
that almost 200,000 licensed employees (i.e., those who are entitled to carry a ﬁ rearm) are 
working for PSSs and PPCs, but the total number probably exceeds 850,000 ( Volkov, 2002, 
p. 137 ). Not unlike the position in South Eastern Europe, regulatory structures for the pri-
vate security industry are weak in Russia. Despite a 1992 federal law on private detective 
and protective activity (which gave legal status to the commercial provision of security), 
business relations are still highly informal. This informality has a negative impact on the 
transparency and accountability of the industry. 
 Table 2  Private security services in Eastern European countries or entities 
 Eastern Europe  Private security force 
 Albania  4,100 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina  ± 2,000 
 Bulgaria  130,000 
 Croatia  ± 15,000 
 Kosovo  2,580 
 Macedonia  3,000 
 Moldova        3,000 – 10,000 
 Montenegro        1,900 – 2,400 
 Romania  37,291 
 Serbia  ± 30,000 
 Russia  >850,000 
 Sources :  Volkov (2002) and  SEESAC (2005 ). 
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 Transnational private security 
 Although the above numbers are somewhat tentative, it is clear that there has been momen-
tous growth in the provision of PSSs in the EU since 1999. One can assume that there are a 
number of factors for this rise, not only  “ natural growth ” and by virtue of the addition of 
new Member States, but also by a belief that PSSs are an appropriate means by which to deal 
with perceptions of growing lawlessness generally, or associated with the move to market 
economies following the collapse of the Soviet Union. This  “ marketization ” or  “ commo-
diﬁ cation ” of policing has also allowed for, if not encouraged, the development of 
transnational security ﬁ rms. Giant multinationals such as the Securitas Group and Group 4 
Securicor have enabled a  “ globalization ” of commercialized security provision to develop 
( Johnston, 2000 ;  Walker, 2003 ). The latter transnational security ﬁ rm, for example, employs 
340,000 staff, operates in 108 countries and generates a yearly turnover of  £ 3.8 billion 
( S 5.69 billion). 5 Moreover, a diversity of commercial security activities is penetrating into 
national and sub-national institutions such as ﬁ re departments, ambulance services, car as-
sistance services, custodial services and even military operations. Group 4 Securicor reports 
that their ofﬁ cers are providing round-the-clock protection for U.S. troops in Kosovo. 6 One 
can, accordingly, safely predict that transnational private security will play a fundamental 
and progressively expanding role in securing business and local (urban) domains in the 
future. 
 Discussion and critique 
 It is the ﬁ nal purpose of this paper to review some of the possible social policy consequences 
of the trend to privatization of policing services in Europe and beyond. There are three main 
lines of the critiques comprising (1) the exclusionary mandate of private security staff, (2) 
the poor professional image of the industry and (3) the paradoxes stemming from the public /
 private security provision divide. These issues will be discussed in turn. 
 A common objection against private security personnel is that they are, by legal contract, 
required to act in an exclusionary manner, and will selﬁ shly protect only those who can af-
ford them, to the detriment of the common good. In other words, the availability of private 
security in an open market place allows privileged individuals and organizations to buy 
more protection than their less-privileged counterparts. Indeed, the so-called  “ gated com-
munities ” ,  “ closed areas ” or  “ security enclaves ” , territorially divided from apparently poor 
and  “ dangerous ” neighborhoods, have emerged in the U.S.A. ( Davis, 1990 ), Brazil ( Wood 
and Cardia, 2006 ) and South Africa ( Minnaar, 2005 ) if not elsewhere. Social exclusion has 
long been recognized as a tool to keep  “ troublesome ” people out of publicly accessible 
space ( Von Hirsch and Shearing, 2000 ).  Hoogenboom (1991) , too, points out that private 
security may become part of dystopian  “ grey policing networks ” that deeply penetrate into 
human associations and serve the interests of wealthy and ruling elites, running counter to 
the social bonds that many would assert are essential to security. Private security guards are, 
after all, paid by those who potentially agree on policing activities in favor of their own 
 
5
  See  www.group4securicor.com. 
 
6
  See Group 4 Securicor International Magazine (October, 2004). 
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priorities rather than serving the community ’ s best interest ( Shearing and Stenning, 1983 ; 
 Prenzler, 1998, 2004 ). 
 It is possible, however, to reconcile private security and the concerns of those who would 
lament the exclusivity that it may engender. That is, it can be safely argued that private 
security and social justice are not mutually exclusive ( Prenzler, 2004, p. 277 ). For example, 
Dutch government programs to reduce disorder on public transport previously employed 
(sworn-in) commercial guards as conductors and guardians at train stations and on the tram 
and metro system. Similarly, municipalities increasingly hire paid security workers in the 
Netherlands ( Terpstra and Havinga, 2005 ) as lowly paid replacements for police ofﬁ cers in 
the enforcement of  “ small nuisances ” such as illegal parking. 
 A subsequent criticism relates to the low professionalism and effectiveness of security 
agencies. Despite the  “ higher proﬁ le ” of security sectors such as forensic accountancy, pri-
vate security guards, who represent the most dominant and visible face of the industry, are 
often regarded as incompetent, amoral, corrupt and shady  “ wannabe ” cops ( Livingstone and 
Hart, 2003 ;  Prenzler, 2004, p. 284 ). The nature of this popular representation of the industry 
is fueled by North American studies on private security, which portray guards (but also 
investigative personnel) as aging, marginally paid, poorly educated and hastily trained 
males, many of whom have a criminal record or an association with dubious characters 
( Kakalik and Wildhorn, 1971 ). Notwithstanding that private security continues to suffer 
from this doubtful image, some transnational companies and industry associations are, in 
theory at least, trying to enhance the quality of services delivered by promoting an image of 
a sector that is able to self-regulate and to distance itself from the more unsavoury players 
( O ’ Connor  et al ., 2004 ). A further tool in this process is state legislation designed to monitor 
the private security industry and to improve its services. The legal standards within the EU 
are, however, diverse and sometimes lax. In response, CoESS, the European umbrella for 
national industry associations, is exploring ways of harmonizing the requirements of the 
different national legal systems. It has been endeavoring to set minimum norms and require-
ments, which, it argues, are important in providing public assurances that companies associ-
ated with CoESS are professional and trustworthy throughout the Union. 
 The third and last point of criticism relates to the persistence of several awkward para-
doxes that continue to shadow the private security industry ( Zedner, 2003 ). Closely related 
to the problem of  “ defensive reassurance ” mentioned above, one paradox is that with 
increasing security options at our disposal, we are not necessarily any safer. While the prag-
matic logic of  “ risk-based thinking ”  – of calculation, anticipation and pro-action  – aims, or at 
least claims, to forestall crime and reduce (feelings of) insecurity, in fact it breeds ever more 
anxiety among people. When people retreat from wider society into their fortiﬁ ed, feudal-like 
enclaves, there is no guarantee that their feelings of anxiety and unease will be lessened ( Mer-
ry, 1981, pp. 194 – 196 ). On the contrary, a signiﬁ cant consequence of privatized police aus-
pices is that they engage in risk-reduction activities, but at the same time take advantage of 
crime panics. The persistency of insecurity may be a challenge for the private security indus-
try, but it also legitimizes it ( George and Button, 2000, p. 35 ). Ironically, for reasons of their 
 “ own safety ” , citizens are constantly alerted to dangers, with potentially negative consequenc-
es. It is, in other words, an idle hope that societies will ever be able to eliminate insecurity and 
crime. Claims that this is possible in a world of market-driven competition for the best 
security product are, at best, misleading and, at worst, dangerous. 
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 A ﬁ nal paradox is that the upsurge of private security has arguably expanded rather than 
diminished the penal state. That is, the privatization of policing has extended the state ap-
paratus of criminal justice despite the neo-liberal rhetoric of  “ rolling back the state ” . Rising 
private security demands for regulatory bodies that oversee, license and audit the industry in 
turn generate a whole new complex of coordinators, managers and regulatory inspectors. 
Far from diminishing, the institutional architecture of crime control strengthens its position 
in society ( Garland, 2001, p. 170 ). This paradox has ramiﬁ cations for democratic societies 
as a whole and their citizens in particular. Notwithstanding that security, in the positive and 
inclusive sense, promises universal freedom from damage, loss, stigmatization and condem-
nation, the pursuit of  “ full ” reassurance has an all-too-strong tendency towards undesired, 
even perverse outcomes. The collective desire for security, if not handled appropriately, can 
easily derail in a policing culture that infringes unfairly upon civil liberties and, ultimately, 
undermines the face-to-face relations of trust and solidarity on which a well-ordered society 
is built. 
 With this, then, the importance of good governance comes into prominence. The diversi-
ﬁ cation and pluralization of policing and the mushrooming of private security industries has 
given rise to the necessity of coordination in the form of oversight, management and control 
to avoid a counterproductive, unjust and overzealous distribution of services. However, in 
the context of the EU ’ s preoccupation with liberalization and deregulation, the nationally 
institutionalized  “ statutory controls ” of private security may be altered or replaced by great-
er emphasis on industry self-regulation and accountability through  “ market forces ” in the 
future. Yet, as  Sarre and Prenzler (1999) note, self-regulation, done properly, has great 
advantages for national industry associations and industry  “ ombudsmen ” . The scope of this 
accountability mechanism is limited, however, as not all business and companies are 
afﬁ liated with them. 
 Furthermore, the use of self-regulation instruments (e.g., quality marks and codes of 
conduct) also requires an external watchdog to  “ guard the guards ” and intervene where 
necessary. There is convincing evidence that the market economy, speciﬁ cally in a growth 
industry, is not capable of taking out suspect and poorly functioning companies. Keen 
competition may, in fact, force margins down to the point where companies are strongly 
motivated to undercut competitors by paying under-award wages and misrepresenting serv-
ice levels ( Prenzler, 1998 ). Researchers and policy-makers should be turning their gaze to 
appropriate and effective models of cooperation and regulation in which all players who 
participate in policing networks are represented. The state, despite trends towards  “ privati-
zation ” and  “ Europeanization ” , has a key role to fulﬁ ll, as it is responsible for balancing 
commercial and public interests in a way that best serves social issues of equality, democ-
racy, fairness and performance. 
 Some ﬁ nal remarks 
 The present shifts towards private options in policing are likely to continue apace across the 
EU. Commercial integration and the freedom to move goods, capital and services across 
Europe to Asia are becoming increasingly more common and there is little reason to suspect 
that there will not be a similar integration of security services. This  “ Europeanization ” of 
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industry, commerce and trade pushes private security and private policing options to the 
fore. In spite of such integration, the legal regulation of private security varies signiﬁ cantly 
from country to country. Many questions about public supervision of private security per-
sonnel in the EU and beyond remain largely unanswered. 
 Governments cannot shirk their responsibilities to coordinate security and policing, 
whether it is publicly or privately funded. Governments must, instead, serve as central 
anchor points to facilitate, direct and safeguard all policing activities including multi-agency 
networking to ensure efﬁ cacy, equity, legality, responsibility and accountability within the 
private security sector (Loader and Walker, 2001). 
 In the longer term, governments should also commit to developing and adapting 
laws and regulations to match the changing realities of policing, so that they do not 
remain framed in terms of a concept of policing (essentially public policing) that is 
no longer valid. In other words, as the more diverse forms of policing develop, the 
laws of rights and responsibilities, powers and immunities need to change accord-
ingly ( Sarre and Prenzler, 2005, p. 217 ). 
 One strategy could involve bringing all  “ policing ” practices under the control of demo-
cratic institutions such as commissions, citizen boards and other  “ watchdogs ” at local, 
regional, provincial and national levels to ensure that they are not acting in a fashion that is 
counter-productive to the desired outcomes ( Jones, 2005 ). If this can be achieved, countries 
of the EU will be better able to claim that their citizens are not only enjoying a satisfactory 
level of protection, but are doing so in an open and equitable manner. 
 Conclusion 
 Policing arrangements in the EU are diverse, complex and multifaceted, which requires re-
searchers to shed light on the shapes, sizes and legal systems of essentially commercial se-
curity industries, both national and transnational. The democratic state, far from remaining 
aloof from the described trends, has a key role to play. It is the primary guarantor of collec-
tive security interests. This axiom should be borne in mind as the trend towards private 
provision of security in the EU continues strongly into the future. 
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